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Abstract

In October 2010 the Constitutional Council of France approved a law banning the burqa and
niqab from all public places. Joining the ongoing scholarly discussion on veiling, this study
seeks to understand the role the French press played in legitimating the ban, the first of its kind
to be implemented in Europe. I argue that discourse in the press made the legislation appear
reasonable and necessary because of its association with gender inequality and religious
fundamentalism. This media narrative legitimated the legislation by presenting the veil as
intolerable and “against public social order.” Made necessary by rapidly shifting demographics
in contemporary France, this discourse was couched in a defensive employment of laïcité.
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Introduction
A Genealogy of the Bill
The law, which has come to be known as the “Burqa Bill,” passed the French Senate on
Tuesday, September 14, 2010 with an overwhelming majority of 246 to 1. The press did not
publish the identity of the sole dissenter. Having passed the lower house in July, the
Constitutional Council reviewed the bill and approved it on October 7, 2010. But, to understand
the origins of this bill, let me first trace its history.
The law banning the burqa and the niqab from public places was first conceived
following a speech that President Nicolas Sarkozy delivered to Parliament on June 22, 2009. In
this speech, Sarkozy declared “The Burqa is not welcome in the territory of this Republic. It is
not an idea that that the Republic believes brings dignity to women."1 Though legislators ran
into difficulties drafting a bill that they perceived to be legally sound, the French cabinet
approved a draft of a law intended to ban the Muslim full-face veil from public spaces on
Wednesday, May 19, 2010. Following this victory, Sarkozy told assembled ministers that “in
this matter the government is taking a path it knows to be difficult, but a path it knows to be
just.”2 In a document obtained by Le Figaro listing the reasons for the bill and in order to banish
full veiling, the drafters of the document “evoke the dignity of the human person – even though
some women would be willing – public order in its broad sense, that of living together, and
finally, issues of security.” 3

1

L a Burqa n'est pas la bienvenue sur le territoire de la République. Ce n'est pas l'idée que la République se fait de
la dignité de la femme. “Burqa : la France prend-elle un risque ? (The Burqa: Is France taking a risk?)- LeMonde.fr,”
n.d., http://www.lemonde.fr/a-la-une/article/2010/05/05/burqa-la-france-prend-elle-un-risque_1347074_3208.html.
2
“French cabinet approves burqa ban law,” Agence France Presse, May 19, 2010.
3
cgabizon@lefigaro.fr, Cécilia Gabizon;“Loi sur la burqa; avis défavorable du Conseil d"État.” (The law against the
burqa: the unfavorable opinion of the Conseil d"État) Le Figaro, May 14, 2010, A edition, sec. LE FIGARO France.
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On Tuesday, July 6, 2010, the parliament began a three-day period of debate. Members
of the Socialist party announced that they would boycott the vote, protesting the ban on the fullface veil in all public places.4 Following the debate period, the National Assembly voted on
Tuesday, July 13, 2010 to approve the ban by a vote of 355 to one. As promised, members of the
Socialist party abstained from voting.5
The law contains seven articles and bans full-face coverings in all public places. It makes
exceptions for ski masks, helmets, carnival masks, masks worn for welding and construction
work, and interestingly, Father Christmas costumes.6 It defines public space very broadly,
including government buildings, public transportation systems, and all streets, markets,
thoroughfares, private businesses and entertainment venues. The law also allowed for a sixmonth grace period to educate women. Following the grace period, a fine of €150 will be
imposed on those caught wearing the veil. Upon their first offense, women can choose to
participate in a citizenship course instead of paying the €150 fine. Men who force their wives or
daughters to cover themselves for religious or cultural reasons face harsher penalties, this
constitutes the creation of a new crime, that of forced facial concealment. They can be fined up
to €30,000 and face a one-year jail term. The fines will be doubled if the concealed person is a
minor.7 The law also applies to tourists.
While much scholarship concerns itself with the treatment of French-Muslim women
within the context of the headscarf ban in public schools, the free expression of religion (even
Islam) has remained protected in public places until recently. Therefore, no current scholarship
4

“French lawmakers debate Muslim veil ban,” Agence France Presse, July 6, 2010.
Ibid.
6 “French lawmakers approve full veil ban,” Agence France Presse, September 13, 2010.
7 “N° 2262 - Rapport d'information de M. Éric Raoult fait au nom de la mission d'information sur la pratique du port
du voile intégral sur le territoire national,” n.d., http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i2262.asp. (The
informational report of Mr. Éric Raoult in the name of the inquiry of the practice of wearing the full veil in the
territory of the state)
5
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on the banning of the full veil exists. This paper, then, joins the ongoing scholarly discourse of
veiling at a point of unique convergence. It argues that the women’s rights frame offered by
mainstream print media in France is itself a veil. Behind it one finds a familiar patriarchal
discourse of the Muslim woman as victim, legitimating – nay, necessitating – a law to “save”
her. This discourse is couched in a defensive employment of laïcité.
The Muslim Population in France
Muslims have been part of French society for more than a century. 8 They constitute a
large and highly visible portion of the French population. In fact, France has the largest
population of Muslims – an estimated 10% - of any European country, the majority of whom are
of North African descent. Islam is now the second largest religion in the country. Islam is also
the fastest growing religion in France9 and this growth has been accompanied by ethnic tensions
between Muslims and non-Muslims.10
The first influx of North Africans into France took place between 1915 and 1918.11
During this time, France recruited approximately 150,000 laborers from its colonies in North
Africa. The French government transported these workers to France and later granted them
citizenship.12 The majority of these laborers came from the French colonies of Morocco, Algeria
and Tunisia. Typically, the government only recruited men for labor. However, many of the

8

Stephen M., Croucher, “French-Muslim Reactions to the Law Banning Religious Symbols in Schools: A Mixed
Methods Analysis..” Journal of International & Intercultural Communication 2, no. 1 (February 2009): 1.
9
Robert Levine. Assimilating Immigrants: Why America and France cannot. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2004.
10
Croucher, “French-Muslim Reactions.” p 3.
11
Ibid.
12
Joel Fetzer. Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
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North African men who immigrated as laborers later called upon their families to join them in
France.13
Significance
This law demonstrates a break from French legal precedence. Previous legislation has
been limited to regulating the religious expression of minors in public schools, which are
publicly owned and therefore public institutions. This is because minors in France are not
deemed legally capable of making informed decisions about group membership and
identification. Other legislation has targeted the religious expression of adults, but this has been
limited to government employees working in publicly owned spaces. These employees, as
government representatives, are not permitted to display membership to any group (other than
the French Republic) that may affect the way other citizens interact with or perceive them. The
current law, then, breaks from this legal precedence by limiting the religious expression of adults
in all public places.
France is the first European country to ban the burqa and niqab from public places.14
However, after the approval of the ban by the Constitutional Council, several European countries
began drafting similar legislation, demonstrating France’s influence on European domestic
policy making. This paper explores the way this legislation was negotiated and, ultimately,
legitimated in the French press.
To date, no scholarly works discussing the “Burqa Ban” have been published, rendering
this project both current and groundbreaking. Drawing from more than 150 French news articles
from daily publications throughout France, this project paints a detailed picture of the “burqa
13

Adrian Favell. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain. New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998.
14 Turkey passed a law banning the burqa in 1925 but has not yet been granted membership to the European
Union. Additionally, Belgium passed a law banning the burqa and niqab from public places in 2010 but the
law had not been implemented at the time this paper was written.
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ban” in the French press. Joining the ongoing scholarly conversation on veiling in France, this
study seeks to understand the role the French press played in legitimating the ban on the full veil
and contributes to the understanding of the discourse surrounding the veil, a powerful symbol of
Islam throughout the world.
Research Questions
1. How was the state-determined political agenda promoted or opposed in the French press
to legitimize or delegitimize the Burqa Ban legislation?
2. What frames and arguments were used in the legitimation and delegitimation process?
3. Were state-determined frames of the issue (such as “women as victims”) reflected in
news coverage of the Burqa Ban legislation?
4. Were oppositional voices represented in the French press?
Data
To answer these questions, I examined coverage of the “Burqa Bill” in two Parisian
dailies, Le Monde and Le Figaro; one French news agency, Agence France Presse (AFP); and
four regional French dailies: Ouest France, Sud Ouest, Midi Libre, and L’est Républicain. It is
crucial to include regional dailies in this study because they reflect the great importance attached
to regional identity in France and are thus important tools used in the construction and
maintenance of public opinion. Furthermore, the Parisian dailies are essential sources because
they are the newspapers of choice for the well-educated and elite classes, these are the classes
from which policy makers often hail. All publications in this study were selected for their
historical importance as news sources, their high circulation, and their reputations as wellrespected sources for news in France. Furthermore, these publications were all accessible online
through Factiva.
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Table 1

Le Figaro

May ‘10

July ‘10

September ’10

October ‘10

April ‘11

50 articles

29 articles

9 articles

13 articles

9 articles

15

7 included

4 included

4 included

3 included

32 articles

17 articles

17 articles

21 articles

7 articles

10

6 included

6 included

5 included

2 included

included
AFP

included
Ouest

17 articles

9 articles

5 articles

9 articles

8 articles

France

6 included

3 included

2 included

3 included

3 included

Sud Ouest

24 articles

13 articles

7 articles

12 articles

8 articles

7 included

4 included

3 included

4 included

3 included

35 articles

11 articles

7 articles

9 articles

14 articles

12

4 included

2 included

3 included

5 included

Midi Libre

included
L’Est

4 articles

0 articles

1 article

1 article

9 articles

Républicain

2 included

0 included

1 included

1 included

3 included

Le Monde

25 articles

11 articles

9 articles

8 articles

20 articles

8 included

5 included

4 included

3 included

8 included

To create a manageable yet comprehensive and representational data set, this study was
comprised of a random sampling of all stories concerning the burqa, niqab, or the law banning
them from each of the seven sources during the months of legislative action. Therefore, articles
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were gathered for the months of May 2010, July 2010, and October 2010. Additionally, a
random sampling was taken for all seven sources from the month of April 2011, the month that
the law was implemented. Because news about the “Burqa Ban” was less timely and relevant
during the months when no legislative action took place, and therefore less likely to appear in the
press, those months were not included in this study.
To ensure the collection of a truly random sample, an online random sample generator
was used. A random, proportional sample was taken from each source for each month selected
for the study. To see a breakdown of the samples taken by month and publication see Table 1.
Framing Theory and News Media
Framing theory is omnipresent in the social sciences and humanities, however, it is
particularly useful in media studies, where it can be helpful in understanding and describing the
power of a communicating text. According to Entman, to frame is “to select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
or recommendation for the item described.”15 A frame then, diagnoses, evaluates, and
prescribes. By establishing problems, frames also limit the possible solutions. He notes, “the
problem is that facts do not speak for themselves. Choosing how to put facts together and which
to emphasize inevitably affects what audiences perceive as reality…”16
Frames function to make a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful or
memorable to audiences. Reese’s work on framing and the “war on terror” demonstrates that
once a dominant frame has been established, it is extremely difficult for a convincing
counterframe to be advanced. The result, he notes, is that “political debate takes place largely
15

Entman, Robert. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication (n.d.): 51.
Entman, Robert. Democracy Without Citizens: Media and he Decay of American Politics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989. (p. 30)

16
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within the boundaries set by the frame with general acceptance of the assumptions built into it.”17
What is excluded from a frame is just as important as what is included. In their
discussion of the connection between framing of AIDS policy and public perception, Sniderman,
Brody and Tetlock found that “the effect of framing is to prime values differentially, establishing
the salience of one or the other.”18 Therefore, what is not included in a dominant frame or stock
of frames is not likely to enter into public consciousness. Unpublicized, alternative views will
gain few supporters and are unlikely to have a significant effect on public opinion or perception.
Kosicki and Pan’s influential work on framing analysis points out the role of three
different players in the media framing process: journalists, sources and audience. This
multifaceted approach to framing obviates the fact that frames emerge for different reasons,
depending on the characteristics of the involved actors.19 Therefore, as Entman has suggested,
“the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or
interests that competed to dominate the text.”20
Methodology
The discourse of each text was analyzed using a Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), a
research approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA critically investigates social
inequality as it is “expressed, constituted, legitimized and so on, by language use.”21 One of the
aims of the DHA is to “‘demystify’ the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the

17

Reese, Stephen D. “The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited.” Journal of
Communication 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 148-154.
18
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock. Reasoning and choice: explorations in political
psychology. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
19
Kosicki, Gerald, and Pan. “Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse.” Political Communication 10, no. 1
(1993): 55-75.
20
Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.”
21
Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer. “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Meodology.” In
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 1-33. Second Edition. London: SAGE Publications, 2009.
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ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance.”22 The DHA also considers intertextual
and interdiscursive relationships between texts, genres, and discourses, as well as social and
sociological variables, the history of the problem in question and situational frames. Reisigl and
Wodak describe the DHA approach to CDA as being three-dimensional: after “(1) having
identified the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) discursive strategies are
investigated. Then, (3) linguistic means and the specific, context-dependent linguistic
realizations (as tokens) are examined.”23 Heuristically, scholars using the DHA orient
themselves to questions of how persons, objects, events, processes and actions are referred to
linguistically, what characteristics are attributed to certain actors, objects, events and processes,
what arguments are employed in a given discourse, from what perspective these arguments are
addressed and whether they are intensified or mitigated.
Though the Discourse Historical Approach focuses on many discursive strategies24, this
project is interested in strategies of argumentation and strategies of framing or discourse
representation. Using the DHA, the discourse of each text was analyzed, with special attention
given to dominant, intertextual frames. It is important to discover the latent meaning behind
these frames and their participation in the legitimation of the “Burqa Bill.” While exploring the
strategies of argumentation used in the texts, I focus on the justification of positive and negative
aspects of the Burqa Ban and how these arguments were used to legitimize or delegitimize the
legislation.

22

Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. “The Discourse-Historical Approach.” In Methods of Critical Discourse
Analysis, 87-120. Second Editon. London: SAGE Publications, 2009.
23
Ibid.
24 According to Reisigl and Wodak, the DHA focuses on discursive strategies such as referential strategy or
strategy of nomination, strategies of predication, strategies of argumentation, strategies of perspectivization,
framing or discourse representation and strategies of intensification and mitigation within the texts. Reisigl
and Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach.”

10
Legitimating the Veil in the French Press
The Interior Minister of France has estimated that a mere 2,000 women in France wear
the full Muslim veil. France’s population, including its overseas territories is estimated to be
65,312,24925 meaning that the “Burqa Ban” affects a mere .003% of the French population.
What, then, has caused this seemingly disproportionate reaction? To understand this, one must
first understand why Muslim veiling, a practice that has been controversial in France since 1989,
is a particularly sensitive issue. In responding to this, an appreciation of the effective
mobilization of public sympathy for the women who wear the veil, often depicted as victims who
have been forced to wear these garments, and a knowledge of France’s history associated with
veiling is absolutely essential.
Chapter 1 of this study will discuss the portrayal of Muslim women in French press
coverage of this ban. It shows that the French media narrative has characterized Muslim women
as victims. This portrait is part of a familiar stock of frames associated with veiling in France. It
is, as Ticktin notes, part of a neocolonial discourse of “saving” Muslim women.26 Characterizing
Muslim women in this way ensured public sympathy for these women, 27 making it appear
necessary for a law to be implemented in order to rescue these women from their “mobile
prisons.” This narrative allowed journalists, politicians and activists to frame the “Burqa Ban” as
a women’s rights issue.
The historical context of this law is also of immense importance. For this reason, in
Chapter 1 I also explore the history of veiling in France. This historical discussion unpacks the

25

“CIA - The World Factbook”, n.d. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html.
Ticktin, Miriam. “Sexual Violence as the Language of Border Control: Where French Feminist and Antiimmigrant Rhetoric Meet.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society 33, no. 4 (Summer2008 2008): 863-889.
27
“Europe Contre la burqa Vice-présidente du Parlement européen, c...” (Europe Against the burqa Vice-President of
the European Parlaiment, c…) Midi Libre, May 3, 2010.
26
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controversy that veiling has caused in France. Additionally, it draws from contemporary
scholarly discourse on the 2004 law banning the hijab from French public schools to illuminate
the trends that have emerged in French press coverage of veiling. This facilitates the
understanding of how the “women’s rights” frame emerged and why it was so effective in
legitimating the “Burqa Ban”.
France’s political and religious heritage has played an important role in influencing the
mediated discourse surrounding the veil. Throughout the 20th and 21st century the practice of
Muslim veiling has been represented as incompatible with French “republican values”. To
understand why this practice is perceived to be fundamentally unFrench, despite the fact that it is
worn many France-born Muslims, one must comprehend the uniquely French conception of
republicanism and secularism. For this reason, Chapter 2 explores the development and
manifestation of secularism, or laïcité, in France and its connection to French republicanism.
These values are fundamental to French society. Therefore, although the drafters of the
ban did not explicitly list them among the government’s reasons for the ban, they nevertheless
created a powerful frame used to make the “Burqa Ban” appear legitimate and necessary.
Chapter 2 discusses the way this frame was deployed in the French press. It also discusses a
surprising, albeit infrequent counterframe that emerged in editorials.
Finally, this study concludes with a discussion of the implications of the frames used (and
not used) in legitimating the “Burqa Ban” in the French press. It demonstrates the difficulty of
generating new frames to describe a problem and the effectiveness of deploying commonly used
frames.
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Chapter 1
The Veil and Women’s Rights

The burqa is not welcome in the territory of this Republic it is not an idea that the
republic believes brings dignity to women.
‐ Nicolas Sarkozy, June 22, 2009
This chapter seeks to understand the role and representation of Muslim women in French
press coverage of the “Burqa Bill.” Understanding this representation is important because the
daily lives of thousands of Muslim women are affected by the stipulations and regulations of this
bill. Therefore, after a brief overview of the history of veiling and veiled women in France, this
chapter explores the ways in which the frame of “women’s rights” or the “dignity of women”
was used in French press coverage of the bill.
A Brief History of Veiling
The practice of veiling pre-dates Islam. In fact, the veil is a product of Judaism. Women
in ancient Judea were required by their religion to wear a veil over their heads when praying to
Jehovah,28 and in all depictions of the Virgin Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, she wears a veil
over her hair.29 Female followers of Jesus Christ, believing him to be the son of Jehovah,
continued to practice Judaic veiling. This led to the inclusion of veiling in Christianity.
Ancient Assyrian Kings made the veil fashionable by introducing it into the royal
harem.30 This seclusion soon became popular with women of “proper” social and economic
class. To further emphasize this class distinction, the king forbade slaves and prostitutes from

Stephen Croucher, Looking Beyond the Hijab. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, p 41.
Ibid.
30 Stephen M. Croucher, “French-Muslims and the Hijab: An Analysis of Identity and the Islamic Veil in France..”
Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 37, no. 3 (November 2008): 199-213.
28
29
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veiling themselves. In fact, if a woman veiled herself illegally she could be flogged or even have
her ears cut off,31 a punishment that guaranteed deep shame for the rest of her life.
Despite its origins in Judaism and early incorporation into Christianity, today it is the
Muslim faith in which the tradition of veiling is most common. Though in contemporary society
it is considered a defining symbol of Islam, the veil did not appear as a symbol of Islam in the
Muslim community until approximately 627 C.E. There are many arguments for and against
veiling in Islam and supporters and opponents a like claim the Koran supports their argument.
The most frequently quoted Koranic verse on the subject of veiling is Surah 24:31, which states,
And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their
adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not
to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or fathers or husbands’ fathers, or
their sons or their husbands’ sons, or their brothers or their brothers’ sons or their sisters’
sons, or their women, or their slaves, or male attendants who lack vigor, or children who
know naught of women’s nakedness.“Surat An-Nur [24:31] - The Holy Qur’an ÇáÞÑÂä ÇáßÑíã.”
The emphasis of this verse is on the modesty of the female body. However, this verse is
regularly cited as support for the hijab, burqa and niqab. The burqa is a loose-fitting fitting veil
that falls to the ankles, shielding the entire body of a woman, with an opening for the eyes
through which women are able to see. The niqab is a loose-fitting veil that falls to the shoulders,
covering the face, neck and hair of a woman but allowing her to see through an opening for the
eyes.
The reasons why Muslim women – particularly converts to Islam – choose to veil
themselves are diverse. To understand these reasons, Zuhr conducted surveys among women in
Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan and the United States. She found nine categories that illuminate
reasons why women choose or are sometimes forced to hijab: religious, psychological, political,
31

Driver, Godfrey Rolles, and John C. Miles. The Assyrian laws. Scientia Verlag, 1975.
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revolutionary, economic, cultural, demographic, practical, and domestic.32 Elaborating on these
nine functions, Croucher argued that Muslim women have taken to wearing hijabs as a form of
silent social protest; to blend their French, Muslim and North-African identities; to help them
feel comfortable or secure in their bodies while out in public; and to aid in feeling a closeness to
the Prophet Muhammad and to the Muslim community.33 He found that French-Muslims believe
the Islamic veil or hijab to be a fundamental part of their identity. In his interviews Muslims
describe the hijab as being an important symbol of Islam that runs counter to France’s concept of
secularism, or laïcité. They also asserted that regulations like la Loi 2004-228 (the law banning
“ostentatious” religious symbols in public schools) represent an attempt by France to control
Muslim identity and forcefully integrate the population.34
Many Muslim women, however, claim that veiling empowers them in a number of ways.
They feel that this practice gives them distinct identities, allows them to take control of their
bodies and gives them a sense of belonging to the larger Muslim world.35 Indeed, a study
released by the Open Society Institute many women expressed that they chose to veil themselves
because they were “seeking a monastic life.”36 Other women wear the veil because it
desexualizes their bodies and “is a device for earning respect and ensuring her safety from
potential male viewers.”37 Most importantly, these women assert that “the issue is not that they
have to dress traditionally, but that they choose to embrace the (veil) as a marker of their Muslim
identities.38
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France Unveiled
The veil has been a controversial symbol in France for more than 20 years. The first veil
affair occurred in 1989 in Creil (a suburb of Paris) when the headmaster of a public school
expelled three female students schoolgirls for refusing to remove their hijabs, veils that cover the
neck and hair, but not the face. The girls protested their expulsion by claiming they had a right
to wear hijabs in observance of their religion. The headmaster of the school, however, argued
that the wearing of religious articles violated the French concept of laïcité.3940 The girls’ parents
appealed to the federal government and the Council d’état ruled that the girls had a right to wear
religious attire41. This decision ultimately reinforced laïcité and asserted the state as a governing
entity that would not control religion.
The veil controversy reemerged with the passage of la Loi 2004-228, the 2004 law that
forbade students from wearing “ostentatious” religious symbols such as hijabs, yarmulkes, and
large crucifixes in public schools. The law states: “Dans les écoles, les colleges et les lycées
publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les èléves manifestent ostensiblement une
appartenance religieuse est interdit.”42 The French government argued that the passage of this
law protected laïcité, the same value that upheld the wearing of veils in schools in 1989.
Although the law banned all overtly religious symbols, Croucher found that many Muslims in
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France viewed the law as a carte blanche way of banning Islam from public schools through
“equal legal restrictions.”43
Veiling in the French Press
The frame of “women’s rights” or the victimization of women was one of the frames
most frequently used in legitimating the ban in the French press. For the most part, the opinions
quoted in the French press came from individuals whose lives would not be directly affected by
the “Burqa Ban.” White men of European descent constituted the largest group of individuals
quoted, though the press also quoted white European women, and a few Muslim men. Muslim
women were in the minority of those quoted and women who practiced full veiling were all but
absent from press coverage of the ban. It is significant that the demographic most intimately
affected by this issue was the demographic least represented in press coverage. In fact, an
explanation and exploration into why women veil themselves was absent from the majority of
articles.
This press coverage described women who wore the burqa or niqab as victims, outsiders,
and linked them to terrorism and religious fundamentalism. This language is part of the
hegemonic discourse often used to perpetuate Western stereotypes of Muslim women. By
presenting the women affected by the Burqa Ban as victims, legislators and French citizens alike
were able to “save” the helpless Muslim woman from oppressive religion, subversive social
practices, savage Muslim men, and even from herself. Furthermore, this neocolonial rhetoric
reinforced the familiar binary distinction in which the discussions surrounding veiling in France
are often couched. These descriptions, found in nearly every article that discussed the ban,
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framed the “Burqa Ban” as a women’s rights issue and mobilized public sympathy towards these
women.
Women as Victims
The French press regularly deployed the “women’s rights” frame by depicting Muslim
women, particularly those who wore the burqa or niqab, as victims. In these articles, politicians,
commentators and activists described the women as being victims of an oppressive or
misinterpreted religion44, a patriarchal society45, savage Muslim men46, and even victims of
themselves.47
The French press often portrayed Muslim women as victims of Islam itself. This
characterization served a dual purpose, it reinforced the fundamental French value of laïcité48 by
constructing a narrative in which Islam is dangerous and subversive, and it made Muslim women
44
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appear susceptible to manipulation and influence from religious leaders who intentionally
misinterpreted the Koran in order to create “a society where women disappear from the public
space and are no more than ghosts.”49
Quotations from prominent Islamic scholars and clerics, such as Mohammed Moussaoui,
President of the French Council of Muslim Faith and Abdel Muti al-Bayyumi, a cleric at Egypt’s
prestigious Al-Azhar Mosque further legitimized this characterization. Moussaoui, an
outspoken supporter of the Burqa Ban, believed the burqa to be contrary to the Muslim faith.
Likewise, Bayyumi, who has authored a book against the practice of veiling, proclaimed that he
supported the ban because he believed “the niqab harmed Islam’s image”50 and that “many of
[his] brothers in the Islamic Research Academy support [the ban].”51 Presenting educated,
socially and politically prominent Muslim men in favor of the ban made the law appeared
reasonable and necessary. It also made clerics and practitioners of Islam who opposed the bill
appeared to be radical fundamentalists.
Additionally, many news articles asserted that the burqa and niqab are not products of
Islam, insisting that these garments had been appropriated by the religion for subversive
purposes. Midi Libre described the burqa as “a Pashtun trick to get women to submit,” and the
niqab as a garment that was created in 1932 (and therefore not a product of religion at all).52 In
this way, the press portrayed Muslim women as being victimized by a religion that has been
intentionally misconstrued with the intention of reducing them to little more than “black
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ghosts”53 Likewise, Sud Ouest discounted the practice of full veiling, insisting that the veil is not
religious phenomenon but
a sectarian phenomenon which emanates from the highest level of wahhabi preachers
from Saudi Arabia. They withdraw the young people and the young girls of society by
causing them to live in a bubble cut off from the world.54
Associating the veil with Saudi Arabia’s fundamentalist clerics made the veil appear to be no
more than a tool used to oppress women. In Ouest France, Jean-Michel Boucheron, a member
of the French National Assembly asserted that “the veil is absolutely not the expression of a
religion but that of the patriarchy of another age.”55 Here, Boucheron characterized women as
being withdrawn and cut off from society under the guise of religion. The press indicated that
veiled women do not understand that that their religion is being intentionally misinterpreted to
these ends. For this reason, legislation was necessary to “rid the women from this ignominy.”56
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Mohammed Moussaoui insisted in Le Figaro that
women who veil themselves did so because of a “mistaken interpretation” and that “the women
who bear the veil say they do this to imitate the wives of the Prophet, however, [his wives] were
not veiled.”57 In this passage, women themselves misinterpret their religion. This is the one
instance in which discourse in the press explored women’s personal reasons for veiling.
However, the elaboration was made by a man who invalidated this reason with little explanation.
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In addition to being victimized by their religion, the press in France described Muslim
women as being victimized by a patriarchal society bent on female submission. This is achieved
through the emphasis the press placed on the claim that the veil is contrary to “republican
values” and that it constitutes an abuse of human rights.
The most notable instance of this manifestation of the “women’s rights” frame appeared
in a July 29 article published by AFP. The article introduced readers to a teacher at a Muslim
university in eastern India who had been prevented from teaching because she refused to wear
the full veil mandated by the “fundamentalist” student association. The female teacher lamented
that “most of the teachers do not like the dictate of the students to wear the burqa, but they have
no option but to accept it.”58 She warned that this act constituted “the Talibanisation of
educational premises and [that] there is no one to come to [the women’s] rescue.”59
This article functioned as a warning to French readers. It cautioned that without a law
banning the burqa, France, too, could someday be at the mercy of patriarchal Islamists. By
banning the veil, France would effectively denounce “all obscurantism, fundamentalism and
practices detrimental to human rights or dignity of women”60 and recognize that “radical
practices detrimental to the dignity and equality between men and women, including wearing a
full veil are contrary to republican values.”61 This article gave readers a glance into France’s
possible future and presented them with a choice, to ban or not to ban the full veil.
Another portrayal of women as victims in the French press can be found in the depiction
of Muslim men as savages. To do this, articles emphasized practices such as polygamy, violence
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against women, and the treatment of women as possessions. It is important to note that all of the
authors of these articles were of European descent. This created a distinction between the
civilized white man and the exotic, savage Muslim man. Through the publication of articles
revealing the cruel nature of the Muslim man, the press constructed a narrative that elevated the
white, secular, European man to the role of “white knight”, with the Muslim woman as his
“damsel in distress” and the dark Muslim man as the sinister villain.
Three articles in this data set reported the polygamous behavior of Muslim men.62 In two
of the three instances the men had married a European woman in order to gain citizenship; with
the intention of divorcing her once he secured it. In another instance, the wife of a polygamous
Muslim man accused her husband of domestic violence. She claimed that while she was
pregnant her husband had “beaten her in the belly with his fists with the intention of aborting the
baby.”63 These articles perpetuated the “women as victims” narrative by silently urging readers
to save the women from these adulterous, violent men. The press offered the burqa ban as a way
to save these victims of the brutal Muslim man.
In addition to polygamy and violence, the press depicted Muslim men as treating women
like objects. A May 22 Le Monde article describes these men as forcing their wives to veil
themselves for the sake of a competition with other Muslim men, in this way
many [Muslim women] undergo the escalation of husbands whose taste for [the full veil]
is neither religious nor very spiritual. Men like to show off the bigger car to impress their
friends. Those contests are covered women: it is the one with the largest …thickness of
fabric.64
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The article goes on to equate full veiling to “contemporary slavery.”65 This discourse reduced
Muslim women to slaves and depicted Muslim men as their masters, possessors and captors.
Therefore, the burqa ban is effectively legitimated by necessitating the liberation of these
enslaved women. If the veil is equal to slavery, then a life unveiled is a life of freedom and
freedom is a value that no member of a democratic society can reasonably object to.
The final and perhaps most sinister way in which press coverage portrayed women as
victims and perpetuated the “women’s rights” frame was by characterizing these women as
victims of their own choices and behaviors. By emphasizing their willingness to submit and
their lack of cultural understanding the press presented these women as having allowed
themselves to become victims. The emphasis on the “pedagogical” or “meditation” period of six
months that the bill required before coming into effect implied that women must be educated on
the bill and, unlike other French citizens, could not understand the implications of the bill for
themselves. Furthermore, the option of a “citizenship” course in lieu of a fine for wearing the
burqa assumed that these women could not grasp what it means to be a French citizen but rather,
must be taught. Here again, Mohammed Moussaoui legitimated the bill and its implications by
publicly asking “the regional councils of the Muslim faith to gather the imams to define an action
plan in order to reduce this practice [of veiling],” he insisted, “we must tell these women that
they should not rely on imported fatwas or advice on the internet.”66
In addition to victimizing themselves through a lack of understanding and education, the
press depicted Muslim women as self-victims by choosing to wear the veil. In fact, discourse in
the press often asserted that “women concealing their faces, voluntarily or not, are placed in a
situation of exclusion and inferiority manifestly incompatible with the constitutional principles
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of freedom and equality.”67 In this way, women victimized themselves by choosing to submit to
a practice that stripped them of their freedom and equality. Discussing the willingness of
Muslim women to submit to the full veil in Le Monde, journalist Caroline Fourest argued that:
“The fact that women wear [the full veil] by being willing, or say to be, does not detract
from its violence. Quite the contrary. To accept and even defend the right to humiliation
illustrates the destructive capacity of such a proselyte mentality.”68
Here, all the reasons that Muslim women choose to veil themselves are delegitimized and
reduced to violence and humiliation. The author did not entertain more noble (and rational)
reasons for veiling such as a desire for modesty, closeness with the Prophet, or even reasons
revolutionary in nature such as veiling one’s self as a symbol of protest. Instead, Fourest
discussed the subversive ways in which veiling could be used, perpetuating the narrative of
women as victims and necessitating measures to “save” her, if only from herself. In this way,
women were not only victimized by men who force them to degrade themselves by wearing the
veil, they are victimized by themselves because they do not understand that the burqa is
degrading. This depiction of the Muslim woman is one that compelled readers to feel that she
must be “saved” in this case, by a bill banning burqas. It is a moral and political argument which
elevated legislators to the position of savior for their chivalrous attempt at rescuing the Muslim
woman from her male oppressors and her own ignorance.
Women as Outsiders
The actors in the press often used the frame of “women’s rights” to portray Muslim
women as outsiders. Indeed, the very existence of this frame implied that these women are exist
on the margins of society and need to participate (and be allowed to participate) more fully in
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French culture. However, many Muslim men and women felt as though the ban intentionally
excluded from society, prevented them from expressing their religion in public places and from
fully enjoying their right to religious expression afforded to them as members and citizens of the
European Union.
Supporters of the ban described veiled women as being “locked up”69, in a “mobile
prison”70, “cut off”71 from society and trapped in “contemporary slavery.”72 In fact, verbiage in
the bill itself expressed a desire to “prohibit behaviors that would indirectly counter essential
rules of the republican social contract”73 upon which French society is built and that
these are the same principles of our social pact that prohibit anyone from being locked up
within themselves, cut off from others while living in the midst of them. Their violation
denies equality between men and women and causes women to relinquish a portion of
their dignity.74
This discourse communicated that “fully veiled women are not like other citizens.”75 In
representing these women as outsiders, the law against full veiling appeared necessary in order to
create a more cohesive society and reinforced another commonly wielded frame, the importance
of “living together.” This maneuver gave the frame of “women’s rights” a dual purpose: it
extended an opportunity to “save” Muslim women from marginalization and to protect French
values in an increasingly homogenous world.
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Opponents of the bill expressed fear that the “Burqa Ban” would “further exclude women
from society.”76 Here one found opposition from Muslim men and women. Some worried that
“the proposal to prohibit the presence of women wearing the burqa or niqab in public institutions
such as hospitals or government facilities [could] only result in discouraging women from going
there.”77 Others worried that the law would result in their wives choosing to “remain cloistered at
home”78 and thereby isolating themselves because they felt unwelcome in public.
Furthermore, Muslim women themselves asserted that the law barred them from the
public sphere. They believed that it resulted in their exclusion from public places and rejected
their membership in European society. This is one of the few instances in which the press
reported the opposition of Muslim women who practiced full veiling.
Some Muslim women ensured that they would “limit their outings to the ‘bare
minimum’” while others expressed plans to “wear a surgical mask, or settle in a Muslim
country.”79 Other women refused to remove their veils after the law went into effect, they did
this in protest because they felt that the law infringed upon their European rights80 and therefore
prevented them from fully participating in society. These sentiments could be conceived as
“retaliatory exclusion”, or, exclusion for the purpose of protest.
In the French press, supporters and opponents alike used the veil to signify the exclusion
of Muslim women from mainstream society. For supporters of the “Burqa Ban”, the full veil
served as a symbol of slavery and oppression, a fate from which these women needed to be
liberated. For opponents, the bill itself represented the exclusion of these women. Many Muslim
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men and women felt that outlawing the burqa and niqab in public places would force women to
remain at home or prevent them from fully enjoying their rights as European citizens. Despite
the varying means of exclusion, one thing is certain: the veil served as a powerful and highly
visual marker of “otherness.”
Conclusion
This chapter found that the French press used the frame of “women’s rights” to legitimate
the “Burqa Bill” by weaving a narrative that compelled readers to feel that she must be “saved”
in this case, by a bill banning burqas. This moral and political argument elevated the legislators
to the role of saviors and reinforced a familiar neocolonial binary distinction between “Self “ and
“Other”, “East” and “West”, secular France and fundamentalist Islam.
Furthermore, by painting Muslim women as outsiders, the press invoked the principles of
laïcité and the idea of living peacefully together (to be discussed at greater length in later
chapters), concepts which no French citizen could object to. Emphasizing the claim that these
women lived beyond the bounds of traditional French society made the bill appear necessary in
order to protect French culture, which is perceived to be declining as immigrant and Muslim
populations in France continue to grow. In this way, the press offered the “Burqa Bill” as a
solution to the problems created by the victimization of women. The discourse portrayed the bill
a way to rescue the beloved yet wavering French culture while drawing Muslim women into the
fold of mainstream society.
Finally, this chapter found that the French press underrepresented views and voices of
Muslim women in their coverage of the bill. Although this ban is one that intimately affected
Muslim women, coverage of the bill largely excluded the opinions and concerns of these women.
Furthermore, no articles discussed the reasons for which they veil themselves. Rather, the press
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substituted western, hegemonic reasons for veiling for more personal, religious, and sometimes
revolutionary reasons. The marked absence of the views of Muslim women in press coverage
confirms the argument that they are victims and outsiders.
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Chapter 2
The Veil and French Republicanism

This is an important decision for the values of the Republic
- François Fillon, October 8, 2010
As one scholar has noted, France’s reaction to Muslim veiling has been greatly shaped by
“France’s republican tradition of thinking about citizenship, the relation of citizenship to
membership in social and religious groups, and most importantly secularism or laïcité.”81
Indeed, the frame of ‘republican values’ was one of the most frequently used frames in news
coverage of the “Burqa Ban”. In using this frame, politicians and journalists alike suggested that
French Republican values are in danger, need protecting, and are purposefully rejected by the
French Muslim population. This strong political and philosophical argument resonated most
clearly with the political elite, but also with the general population. Republican values, in the
French context, are closely linked with the concept of laïcité, or secularism, and have roots in the
French Revolution and Jacobinism.82
Explaining the effectiveness of this frame in legitimating the legislation requires attention
to the historical intricacies of French political thinking and the specific French context. This
chapter contains a brief history of French republican values, with special attention paid to laïcité.
It illustrates how these concepts are fundamental pillars of the French political ethos and
demonstrates the unique problem that the French Muslim population poses for these concepts.
This chapter then discusses how the burqa has been framed as a threat to ‘republican values’.
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This frame was necessary for two reasons. First, in order to impose a restriction on the
expression of religion the state had to demonstrate that the expression posed a legitimate threat to
public life, and second, the implications implicit in this frame guaranteed popular public and
political support of the ban. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications
of the use of this frame in legitimating the “Burqa Ban.”
Secularism, Citizenship, and French Republicanism
To understand the use of this frame in press coverage of the “Burqa Ban”, an appreciation
of French conception of citizenship and secularism and the historical traditions associated with
these concepts is absolutely essential. The values inherent in contemporary French
republicanism have their roots in the French Revolution. This revolution, beginning in 1789,
aimed not only to overthrow of the monarchy, but all forms of hierarchical undemocratic power,
including the Catholic Church.83 Before this time, the French monarchy had ruled by divine right
with the belief that God had granted the king sovereignty. The Catholic church officiated over
the ordination of each king and for this reason, Catholicism and the monarchy were deeply
intertwined in a system through which their power was mutually validated.
The Roman Catholic Church and the French monarchy were so inseparable that when
Revolutionaries eliminated the monarchy and began to conceptualize a democratic form of
government, they sought to establish a secular state, one as free from religious oppression as it
was from monarchial oppression. Indeed, the secular state is one of the most valued legacies of
the Revolution.84 For more than a century, however, the separation of church and state remained
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only partial. The 1905 Act finally imposed total secularism, prohibiting any state recognition,
funding or endorsement of religious groups.85
Laïcité was further enshrined in France’s conception of republicanism by the decisions of
the Stasi Commission, which established that:
the secular state, guarantor of freedom of conscience, protects not only freedom of
religion and of speech but also the individual; it allows all to freely choose, or not, a
spiritual or religious option, to change it, or to renounce it. It makes sure that no group,
no community can impose on anyone a belonging or a denominational identity, especially
because of his or her origins.86
Here one finds a notion of secularism that differs from the liberal tradition of separation of
church and state more familiar to American observers. While American freedom of religion
mandates that religion be protected from the state, France’s semi-theocratic heritage led to the
belief that the state and its citizens should be protected from religion. In this way, overt
expression or identification with a particular religion or religious group is seen as a threat to the
state and its secular values.
During the French Revolution, groups known as Jacobin Clubs began to appear. These
clubs constituted the most popular political group of the Revolution. Before long, the term
“Jacobin” came to refer to anyone who supported revolutionary ideas. Preference for
centralization of control and a unity of value systems, characteristic of France, stems from this
tradition. In contemporary France the centralized, unitary Jacobin system necessitates an
individualist relation between the state and people. This means that no institutions or groups
should represent citizens within a society. The Jacobian philosophy insists that a uniform,
republican identity must take precedence over any other aspect of an individual’s identity, be it
85
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linguistic, religious, ethnic or other.87 Simply put, a citizen’s individuality should be
emancipated from the pressures of groups seeking to control members’ identity through
coercion.88 Therefore, within the public sphere, the French people are to relate to one another
first and foremost as a single, unitary group of citizens. This, it is believed, is the greatest
guarantor of national identity.89 In this system, the ethnic citizen does not and should not exist.
For this reason, French notions of integration revolve around assimilation. One must
shed one’s minority identity in favor of “Frenchness” and strive to achieve cultural similarity.
France’s approach to colonizing Algeria reflected this approach to assimilation. The colonization
of Algeria was not merely economic, but cultural as well. The French Republic, to a certain
extent, considered the Algerians to be really French. Indeed, as Vivian notes, “much of the
historical interaction between France and Algeria was characterized by France’s recurrent
assertion that Algeria was essentially French.”90 They erected French-style architecture in
Algerian towns and encouraged the Algerians to adopt the French language.91 Additionally, in
the early days of the Algerian colonization, the French military enacted a policy of forced
assimilation that included the unveiling of Algerian women.92
Seen in this way, secularism and French republicanism are as deeply intertwined as the
monarchy and Roman Catholicism. If French republicanism mandates a uniform populace, then
religion must remain wholly absent from the public sphere. Within this framework, Christianity
and Judaism present no real threat to republican values because, in most cases, there is no
outward or “ostentatious” marker of “otherness” among these groups. They are rarely seen
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wearing overt markers of their faith and do not often participate in public expressions of their
religion such as praying in the streets. French Muslims, however, are a highly visible and
identifiable group both ethnically and religiously.93 The majority of French Muslims are of
North African heritage. Therefore, they are ethnically distinct from those members of the French
population whose ancestry is strictly European. Furthermore, many Muslim women practice
veiling, choosing to wear the burqa, niqab, or hijab. These veils, though not historically Muslim,
today function as the most recognizable symbol of Islam. These outward markers of religious
membership are seen as a threat to French republicanism, a refusal to assimilate and a violation
of laïcité.
Veiling and Laïcité
Since the veil controversy first emerged in 1989, it has been tied to the concept of laïcité,
one of the most fundamental republican values. During the Creil affair, the headmaster justified
his decision to suspend the two young girls for wearing hijabs by claiming that it violated laïcité
by placing a highly visible marker of religion in the most sacred of secular institutions, the public
school.94 By asserting the girls right to wear religious attire, the Council d’état reinforced laïcité
and asserted the state as a governing entity that would not restrict religious expression. It
qualified this decision by stating that such attire should not be “ostentatious or provocative” in a
way that could constitute propaganda.95 Using this element of the decision, the Minister of
Education, Lionel Jospin, issued a (non-binding) document stating that “ostentatious or
provocative” symbols should not be worn in schools. 96 Throughout the 1990’s, girls continued to
challenge administrators by wearing headscarves and state and national officials continued to
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search for ways of outlawing these symbols from public schools. Tensions continued to rise as
the issue remained unresolved.
In 2003, President Jacques Chirac established the Stasi Commission to investigate the
application of the principles of laïcité in the Republic97 and tasked it with producing a report
detailing suggestions for implementation.98 Chirac’s government highly publicized these
conclusions and sought to harness laïcité’s broad public legitimacy to shape a new consensus
about how to best integrate the large and increasingly visible French-Muslim population.99 As
part of this plan, the report called for a law banning “ostentatious” religious symbols in public
schools. It argued that the purpose of public schools was to assure “autonomy” and “openness to
cultural diversity” and that the assumption of secularity was inherent.100 This resulted in the
2004 law banning “ostentatious” religious symbols in schools. Although in theory this law
applied to all religions, many Muslims saw it as an attack on their faith.101
In this way, the Commission established the defense of laïcité as grounds for limiting the
expression of difference and even the expression of cultural and religious identity.102 The
Commission reaffirmed assimilation as the best means of integration, cautioning that:
…the exacerbation of cultural identity should not become a fanatical defense of
difference, binging with it oppression and exclusion. In a secular society, each person
must be able to take some distance with regard to tradition.
The law itself reflects the importance of secularism in French society.103
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This decision set an important precedent. It created legal justification for the limitation of
individual and religious expression. For this reason, it was essential that the burqa be framed as
a threat to ‘republican values’, particularly, laïcité. In framing the act of full veiling this way,
the French press created a scenario in which policy makers were justified in limiting the religious
expression of Muslim women.
The law banning full veiling makes no mention of Islam, Muslims, the burqa or niqab.104
This marks it as a secular bill because it does not overtly regulate religion or a religious practice.
In this way, laïcité is preserved. However, Sarkozy himself has made it clear that the law is
intended to target the practice of full veiling.105 He repeatedly insisted that the veil is unwelcome
in France. This insistence, coupled with the law’s widely used nickname, the “Burqa Ban”,
made it obvious that while the law itself is secular, it was intended to limit a religious practice.
Laïcité continues to be an important concept in discussions of Muslim veiling. This
evidenced by the frequency with which this and other republican values appeared in press
coverage of the “Burqa Ban.” In fact, even the date of the National Assembly’s vote on the ban
pointed to France’s secular roots. They voted on the Eve of Bastille Day, “when France
celebrates the birth of what was to become a staunchly secular republic.”106 The concept is so
important that prior to the implementation of the “Burqa Ban” in April 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy
called for a national dialog on secularism and the place of Islam in France.
Many scholars have found the tension caused by veiling in France to be binary in nature.
Ardizzoni discussed the rhetoric surrounding the veil in France as being couched in terms of
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restricting binaries: secularism vs. Islam, Us vs. Them, and East vs. West.107 Silverman argued
that the initial headscarf affair in 1989 was constructed in terms of a “binary opposition between
secularism and difference” in a debate in which “Islam denotes religion whereas the secular
republic is beyond religion; Islam as obscurantist and anti-rational where as the secular republic
is founded on the rationalist principles of the Enlightenment.”108 For Croucher, this binary is
manifest as a conflict between Islam and Christianity and the inability of a government
institution to control identity formation and negotiation effectively.109
Implicit in most discussions of the veil in France is the necessitation of assimilation
mandated by a neocolonial interpretation of laïcité. Gudykunst and Kim define assimilation as
“a state that reflects a maximum convergence of strangers’ internal conditions with those of the
natives and a minimum maintenance of the original cultural habits.”110 While they argue that
assimilation creates more “functional” immigrants, other scholars assert that assimilation can
lead to feelings of isolation, depression, hatred toward the host culture, and to a state of
monoculturalism.111 In his many works on the subject, Croucher found that French Muslims
perceived la Loi 2004-228 to be a symbol of forced assimilation.112
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All this is not to say that France is racist, nor that it has a “race problem”. Rather, it
seems, that France is wrestling with issues faced by all former colonial powers. The challenges
that the Muslim population poses to French republican values, first raised by colonialism, have
been exacerbated by globalism and a seemingly irresistible trend towards cultural
homogenization. In an article published by AFP, France’s Justice Minister acknowledged this
difficulty, arguing that “at a time where our societies are becoming more global and complex, the
French people are pondering the future of their nation. Our responsibility is to show vigilance
and reaffirm our commonly-shared values.”113
“An Important Decision for the Values of the Republic”
Having discussed French republicanism and the values therein, one must now ask, what
are the republican values referred to in French press coverage of the “Burqa Ban”? How are they
used and to what end? The two most commonly used values in connection with “republican
values” are laïcité (secularism)114 and the government frame of living together.115 Discourse in
the press also treated gender equality (as discussed in the previous chapter) as a republican value.
Most often, however, the press used threat posed to “republican values” as a stand-alone frame,
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void of any description or qualification. “Republican values,” then, should be read as the values
of secularism, assimilation and gender equality. The first two of these values, being enshrined in
the founding principles of French republicanism, are values that no French citizen could object
to. Therefore, even at its most basic level, the frame of “republican values” is both powerful and
persuasive.
Press coverage of the “Burqa Ban” framed French “republican values” as being
threatened116 or in need of protecting.117 This frame was extremely effective in legitimating the
“Burqa Ban” because any reasonable citizen would want to protect their national values. It is
also an argument that was necessary in order to justify legal restrictions.
This frame was particularly salient because, as Le Figaro reports, many French citizens
“worried about their country in decline. Many of them fear that communitarianism is weakening
national cohesion and solidarity.”118 Communitarianism, or, communautarisme, is considered to
be a danger, underpinning this is the assumption that, if society becomes divided into different
and clearly identifiable groups with mutually exclusive values, these groups will ultimately come
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into conflict with one another.119 This reference to the precarious balance which national
cohesion must constantly negotiate can, understood in the context of French republicanism and
its ideal, uniform populace, be conceived as a failure by the Muslim population to satisfactorily
integrate into French society. This perceived failure to integrate points to the fact that both
ethnically and religiously, Muslims in France constitute a highly visible subset of the population,
a subset which, according to this particular political philosophy, ought not exist.
The fears expressed by Le Figaro are made more apparent when one considers that “71
percent of the French believe that their country is in decline (against 66% in 2005).” Indeed, the
recent fiscal crises and high unemployment rates gripping Europe has triggered fear and strong
antipathy towards immigrants120 and many are asking themselves what it means to be French
today.121 However, many French believe that the country is capable of reform.122 The “Burqa
Ban,” then, became necessary in order to reverse national decline because full veiling was
framed “contrary to the basic requirements of living together in French society.”123 This law
offered a solution to the problems the burqa has come to symbolized.
The ethnic and religious visibility of Muslims in French society also contributed to the
perceived threat to secularism and other republican values. Indeed, “as the Muslims are of a
greater visibility, non-Muslims have the feeling of being invaded,”124 this feeling is complicated
by the growth in the Muslim population during the past century. This visible growth and the
perceived threat that accompanied it has given rise to a number of questions. In an interview
with Le Figaro, Henri Guaino insisted:
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behind the burqa is asked a question essential for our future: at the end of purposes, what
kind of society to do we want to live in? Yes or no, do we want a Republic? Yes or no,
do we reject communitarianism? Yes or no do we want equality of man and woman?
Yes or no do we want to defend our identity, our model of civilization, our conception of
secularism? Now is the time that each must answer.125
This is a clear and effective attempt to rally French citizens behind the ban. It implied that
continuing to allow the burqa to be worn publicly would signal the downfall of French society
and the republican values that underpin it. Guaino’s insistence that “now is the time”126 made the
threat feel imminent, as if a decision to ban the burqa had to be made immediately, for the sake
of France.
The high visibility of the Muslim population, symbolized by the burqa, is seen as
rejection of ‘republican values’ because it suggests that Muslims have chosen membership to
their religion over French citizenship. This is intolerable under the French conception of secular
republicanism. Therefore, a law needed to be passed in order to promote effective assimilation
by forcing French Muslim women to cast off the garments that publicly mark their allegiance to
Islam.
The press consistently framed the act of banning the burqa as necessary in order to
protect the republican value of living together. This is closely tied to ideas of assimilation and
integration inherent in French republicanism. By wearing burqas and niqabs, Muslim women
publicly mark themselves as followers of Islam, a practice inconsistent with that of a uniform
populace. In fact, Justice Minister Michèle Alliot Marie defended the justified the bill, insisting
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that the burqa constituted “a refusal of the spirit of the Republic, who lives openly, and calls into
question the idea of integration.”127
The “citizenship course” offered to women who have been caught wearing the full veil in
public places as an alternative to paying a fine reflected the concern over the failure of some
Muslims to integrate into French society. The assumption here is that if the women are educated
on what it means to be a French citizen, they will assimilate more effectively and embrace
French republicanism. The “citizenship course” suggests that French Muslims do not share the
same history or culture as other French citizens.128
The popular support that the ban received reflected the effectiveness of the frame that the
burqa threatened “republican values.” French papers reported that “more than eight in 10 people
in France said they would approve of a ban on Muslim women wearing full veil s in public,” and
that only 17 percent of French people opposed a ban on burqas.129 The salience of this frame was
also reflected in the outcomes of the vote taken on the ban in both the National Assembly and the
Senate. The National Assembly approved the ban by a vote of 355 to one while the Senate
approved it by an overwhelming majority of 246 to one.130
Contesting the Dominant Frame
Interestingly, the defense of “republican values” was not a universally accepted frame. In
fact, many editorials and interviews rejected this frame, suggesting that it distracted from the real
problems faced by society. Though he considerd the burqa to be an “attack on republican
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principles of equality and anticommunitarianism,” Jean-Michel Quillardet, president of the
International Observatory of Secularism, expressed fears that “secular fundamentalists…are
now using the defense of secularism to fight the ‘Islamization of society’…this is particularly
disturbing because these people never talk about secularism against Christianity or Judaism, even
though there is fundamentalism in all religions.”131 Furthermore, in an editorial examination of
France’s “national mood”, Le Monde reporter Gerard Courtois asserted that while Le Monde
denounces “all obscurantism, fundamentalism and practices detrimental to human rights or
dignity of women (and the wearing of the full veil)… the problem is not the principles, but the
relevance of the means used to enforce them effectively.”132 These opinions represented
opposition to the frame, but not to the ban itself. It is the means of achieving the results that
Quillardet and Courtois questioned. This is because many believed that the law would be
difficult to enforce and would unfairly stigmatize a vulnerable group.
Other editorials pointed out discrepancies in the enforcement and protection of laïcité. In
a section entitled Vos choix133which closely resembles the US model of Letters to the Editor, a
reader asked his fellow countrymen how such a law could be imposed “when we allow all our
soccer players to sign on many occasions when they go on the field, or pray to a god when they
score a goal?”134 This illustrates the inconsistencies of laïcité. With most of France being
Roman Catholic (by heritage if not by practice), such an act would not be considered an affront
to national values because it appeals to a value (Christianity) which most members of the French
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population share. A similar discrepancy can be found in the text of the law itself. Although it
outlaws full-face coverings in all public places an exception is made in the verbiage of the bill
for “Father Christmas costumes”. 135 In this way, full-face coverings worn by Muslim women
are banned, yet an exception is made for Santa Claus costumes. Although he is a secular figure,
Santa Claus is inextricably linked to the Christian holy holiday of Christmas. Here again, the
religious expression of a group of “outsiders” is regulated while an exception is made for those
whose values are considered mainstream.
These discrepancies reflect the inherent ambiguousness of frames such as “republican
values”. The meaning of these values vary from person to person, yet everyone believes in
protecting what they deem to be “republican values.” It is for this reason that the frame was so
salient.
Conclusion
The success of this frame in legitimating and necessitating the “Burqa Ban” is not
surprising. As numerous articles examined for this project indicate, France is in the midst of an
identity crisis. High levels of unemployment, economic distress, social tensions, calls for
immigration reform and the effects of globalization are taking their toll on this once culturally
unique country. Many French citizens feel that their culture, their language, and their values
have been threatened by these forces.136 Given this tense societal climate, framing a law as
necessary for the protection of foundational French republican values virtually guarantees
popular support.
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The social tensions, immigration concerns and cultural heterogeneity that France is
experiencing today is considered by many to be a product of failed assimilation. Therefore,
emphasizing the importance of republican values such as “living together”, “respecting the same
values”,137 and integration was an effective way to legitimate legislation to such threats because
no French citizen could object to these values. This frame functioned to unite French citizens
under the cause of protecting their fundamental national values.
Since French revolutionaries overthrew the monarchy and its cohort, the Roman Catholic
Church, laïcité, or secularism, has been an essential component of French republican identity.
French Muslims pose a unique threat to that value because they are an ethnically and religiously
visible group. The burqa itself is seen as a jarring marker of religiosity in public sphere, an
imposition of the private into the public, and a rejection of secularism. This is exacerbated by
the practice of many Muslims, particularly in Paris and its suburbs, of praying in the streets.
Evoking laïcité as a value that must be protected from these attacks functions as philosophical
and political argument against the Muslim “other.” Because laïcité is a value born on the eve of
the Republic itself, it is virtually unquestionable. Indeed, the strength of this value is reflected in
how little the press challenged its implementation.
In the French press, the burqa became a symbol of outside forces that threaten to weaken
democracy from the inside.138 It represents “the will of certain fundamentalist Muslims to
question the values underlying the republican pact and humanism,”139 and “a refusal of the spirit
of the Republic, who lives openly, and calls into question the idea of integration.”140 By framing
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the burqa and niqab as a challenge, threat or rejection of republican values, the French press
created an argument against these articles of clothing guaranteed to persuade their audience.
Republican values, after all, are values that no French citizen can object to. Therefore, in a time
of deep national uncertainty, discourse in the press made the ban appear necessary in order to
safeguard French culture. In short, it became the answer to France’s national identity crisis.
Finally, and most importantly, by establishing the act of wearing the burqa or niqab as a
threat to ‘republican values’, the French press created a rhetorical situation in which the
limitation of religious expression could be legally justified. In order to ban the burqa, the
historical and legal precedence set by the Stasi Commission in 2004 made it necessary for the
burqa to be framed in this manner. Therefore, this frame was not accidental, nor was it original.
Actors in the French press selected this frame from the traditional stock of frames that have been
used in connection with Muslim veiling since controversy first arose in 1989. The use of this
frame then, not only guaranteed popular and political support for the ban, by presenting national
values as being in danger, it created a situation in which the banning of the burqa was not only
legally defensible, it was necessary.
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Conclusion

This project stemmed from a life-long love for, and fascination with, French culture. As
a graduate student, my interest in the French press and, particularly, the treatment of politics in
the French press has been the incessant subject of my research. When, in May of 2010, I became
aware of a piece of proposed legislation in France that would result in the banning of the burqa
and niqab in all public places, I knew that I had stumbled upon my next research project.
The veil has been a controversial symbol in France for more than 20 years and debate
about the place of Islam in French society dates back to the colonization of Algeria. For this
reason, a wealth of scholarly discourse on these subjects exists. However, to date no one has
published on the “Burqa Ban” in France. This study, then, fills a hole in scholarly discourse
addressing veiling in France.
The implications for French legislative history make this law an important subject for
research and criticism. The law demonstrates a break from French legal precedence. Previous
legislation has been limited to regulating the religious expression of minors in pubic schools,
which are publicly owned and therefore public institutions. This is because minors in France are
not deemed legally capable of making informed decisions about group membership and
identification. Other legislation has targeted the religious expression of adults, but this has been
limited to government employees working in publicly owned spaces. These employees, as
government representatives, should not display membership to any group (other than the French
Republic) that may affect they way other citizens interact or perceive them. The current law,
then, breaks from this legal precedence by limiting the religious expression of adults in all public
places.
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I conducted this study with the purpose of understanding the role the French press played
in legitimating the “Bruqa Ban.” Four research questions guided this study:
1.

How was the state-determined political agenda promoted or opposed in the
French press to legitimize or delegitimize the “Burqa Ban” legislation?

2.

What frames and arguments were used in the legitimation and delegitimation
process?

3.

Were state-determined frames of the issue reflected in news coverage of the
legislation?

4.

Were oppositional voices represented in the French press?

Findings
At the onset of this research project, I expected to encounter frames that directly
reinforced those presented by the French government in a document acquired by Le Figaro. In a
statement of reasons for the bill and in order to banish full veiling, the drafters of the document
“evoke the dignity of the human person – even though some women would be willing – public
order in its broad sense, that of living together, and finally, issues of security.”141 These frames
became the template for state-determined frames, or reasons that the law was necessary.
However, this study found the state-determined frames to be less salient that frames
traditionally associated with veiling. France’s contentious history with the veil meant that a
stock of frames used to describe the problem of veiling had already been cultivated. Reece’s
work on framing illuminates the reason the state-determined frames were less salient. “Political
debate,” he argues, “largely takes place with in the boundaries set by the (dominant) frame.”
Once this dominant frame has been established, it is extremely difficult fro another frame to be
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advanced. Because previous political debates about veiling in France did not include these
frames, they did not enter the discourse surrounding the “Burqa Ban.”
Interestingly, the French press incorporated two of the state-determined frames into two
of the frames most commonly associated with veiling in France. Suggesting that the frame
violated the dignity of the human person framed the veil as a human rights issue. The French
press incorporated this into the “women’s rights” frame. By characterizing the burqa and niqab
as a garment that imprisoned women, discourse in the press evoked the dignity of the human
person while still wielding a frame with demonstrated salience. Additionally, the concept of
living together became an important component of the frame that the burqa threatened
“republican values.” Therefore, while these government-determined frames did not appear as
stand-alone descriptions of the problem of the burqa, they still functioned as important subframes.
The most salient government frame was that the burqa constitutes a threat to national
security. The fear of the veiled woman as a terrorist dates back to the French colonization of
Algeria, and specifically, the Algerian war. The veil became a sign of resistance during the
Algerian War for Independence from 1954 to 1962. Indeed, during the war, fully veiled women
“served as messengers and secretly carried weapons or explosives beneath their coverings.”142
Just as the assimilation of women became the focal point of colonization, Evans argues that “it
was [veiled] women above all else who were emblematic of the revolutionary process…through
carrying weapons and grenades.”143
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This memory of veiled women serving as aids to terror certainly, though perhaps not
consciously, contributed to the link drawn between veiling and terrorism in the French press.
This occurred in two primary ways. First, and most directly, discourse in the press linked veiled
women themselves to terrorism. Additionally, the French press widely reported threats to French
national security made by Osama Bin Laden in retaliation to the “Burqa Ban.” Together with the
memories of the Algerian War, these scenarios functioned to rhetorically link veiled women and
the practice of full veiling to terrorism.
On three occasions the French press directly linked veiled women to terrorism and
terrorist plots. The first of these took place on May 5, when AFP reported that an Indian plane
had been forced to make an emergency landing in Kolkata “after two Russian passengers,
including a woman in a burqa, behaved ‘suspiciously’ on board.”144 Authorities never disclosed
the “suspicious” actions and ultimately released the women without charge, allowing them to
continue their travels. Because authorities did not file charges or specify the “suspicious
actions”, the primary focus of the story is placed on the fact that one of the women wore a burqa,
and refused to remove it. While no actual act of terror occurred here, the article inextricably
linked veiled women to concerns of terrorism and national security.
The second instance in which the press discussed terrorism in connection with the veil
evoked memories of the Algerian war, when women acted as terrorists and weapons smugglers.
Le Figaro made this connection in the form of a news bulletin, printed on September 21. The
Parisian daily reported simply and succinctly that a “woman suspected of being a possible
suicide bomber in Paris” had been arrested.145 This report followed a September 15 article in Le
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Figaro that announced the forced evacuation of the Eiffel Tower and a heavily trafficked
commuter train station due to bomb threats made by terrorists.146 The article led readers to
assume that the woman was arrested in connection with the bomb threats made earlier in the
week. Though no mention of the veil is made, the mere suggestion of a female Islamic terrorist
would have stirred cultural memories of the role of women Algerian war. Furthermore, at a
press conference held to announce the arrest, a passionate policeman exclaimed that “the law on
the burqa…has stirred up fundamentalist anger!”147
Finally, following the enactment of the “Burqa Ban”, Sud Ouest reported that Muslim
women were being encouraged to “resist” the law and being assured that the fines incurred
would be “paid by the community.”148 This report, made on April 11, the day the law came into
force, stated that these calls for resistance came from “Islamists” via email and text messages
The use of the term “Islamists”149 and the mode of communication used to urge women to resist
the law evokes previous reports on techniques used by terrorists to plot previous attacks. The
encouraged resistance of women affected by the ban, supported by an entire community of
Muslims emphasized the difference between the highly religious Muslim culture and strictly
secular France.
The press widely reported threats by infamous terrorist and Islamic fundamentalist
against French national security made by Osama Bin Laden. The discourse used directly linked
these threats to the “Burqa Ban” and to “women’s rights”. Bin Laden voiced opposition to the
ban, accusing France of “exercising oppression…by preventing free women from wearing the
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veil.”150 Here, the known terrorist reversed the “women as victims” manifestation of the
“women’s rights” frame. He argued that the oppression experienced by Muslim women did not
come from the women themselves, their religion, their culture or their men, but from the French
government. By banning the veil, he argued that the French government prevented the women
from exercising their religion. He warned France that the ban on the veil justified “violence
against its nations” and vowed to take revenge.151
This series of articles in the French press legitimated the ban in a number of ways. It
invoked the frame of “women’s rights” in an oppositional manner, arguing that the bill violated
women’s rights. It also reinforced the idea that Muslim men are savages. After all, if a known
Islamic terrorist supported the burqa, then the rational course of action must be to ban the veil,
which would reinforce French republican values and protect women from these dangerous men.
Finally, it linked full veiling to terrorism and evoked painful and frightening memories of
women’s use of the burqa and niqab in the Algerian war. Together, these served as a potent
cocktail of arguments in support of the ban on full veiling.
This study found frames traditionally associated with veiling in France to be the most
salient and frequently used. These frames, “women’s rights” and “republican values”, are frames
that united the French people under a common set of beliefs by describing the problem of the full
Islamic veil in terms that resonated with their culture, heritage, and fundamental values.
Furthermore, these frames could not easily be objected to.
The “women’s rights” frame presented Muslim women as victims, making it necessary to
pass a law that would “save” her from oppression. This frame, made possible by a rise in
international awareness of human rights functioned as a moral and political argument that
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reinforced a familiar narrative in which Muslim women are inescapably imprisoned by their
culture, religion, and personal choices, and are therefore unable to function within mainstream
French society. Excluded from this frame was a discussion of why women choose to veil
themselves. Instead, the press presented veiling by force as the only true reason these women
veil themselves.
Opposition to the “Burqa Ban” could also be found within this frame. It was in this
opposition that the French press quoted the only woman who practiced full veiling. In April
2011, the month the ban became effective, the French press quoted Muslim men and women who
expressed concern that the ban would further exclude the affected women from society. Some
worried that “the proposal to prohibit the presence of women wearing the burqa or niqab in
public institutions such as hospitals or government facilities [could] only result in discouraging
women from going there.”152 Others worried that the law would result in their wives choosing to
“remain cloistered at home”153 and thereby isolating themselves because they felt unwelcome in
public. Muslim women themselves asserted that the ban barred them from the public sphere and
excluded them from French society, making it impossible for them to access and exercise their
rights as citizens of the European Union.
The “republican values” frame suggested that French Republican values are in danger,
need protecting, and are purposefully rejected by the French Muslim population. This strong
political and philosophical argument resonated most clearly with the political elite, but also with
the general population. In order to establish legal justification for limiting religious expression,
which banning the burqa and niqab certainly did, French politicians, aided by the press, had to
convince the French people that the full veil constituted a threat to secularism. Since the veil
152
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controversy first emerged in 1989, it has been tied to the concept of laïcité, one of the most
fundamental republican values, this historical connection ensured the salience and familiarity of
the framing of the burqa as a threat to “republican values.”
Citizens objected to this frame in interviews and letters to the editor. They suggested that
this frame distracted from the real problems faced by French society. Others contested that the
law would be difficult to enforce and would unfairly stigmatize Muslims, an already vulnerable
group. Some editorials pointed out discrepancies in the enforcement and protection of laïcité. In
a letter to the editor, one Frenchman asked his compatriots to consider that soccer players are
allowed to pray after scoring a goal, yet Muslim women could not wear a burqa. Such
discrepancies reflect the inherent ambiguousness of the frame of “republican values.”
It is significant that opposition to the law was expressed using the same frames intended
to support it. This simultaneously emphasizes the effectiveness of dominant, salient frames and
the difficulty of advancing a tertiary frame. However, because discourse surrounding the veil
traditionally used these frames to delegitimize the practice of veiling, oppositional use of these
frames was ineffective.154
The (under) Representation of Muslim Women
The most surprising finding of this study was the under-representation of Muslim
women, particularly those who practiced full veiling, in press coverage of the “Burqa Ban.” Only
one article of the 158 analyzed for this project quoted a Muslim woman who wore a burqa. The
ban affected this demographic most directly, yet they received the least amount of coverage in
the press. Rather, the press predominantly interviewed and quoted men (and a few women) of
European descent, leaving the female Muslim voice all but unheard.
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It is likely that press coverage excluded these women for several reasons. First, Muslim
women who practice full veiling constitute a very small (approximately .003%) and relatively
isolated portion of the French population. Because the majority of these women live in the Paris
suburbs it is possible that journalists working for regional dailies did not have adequate access to
a burqa wearing woman. Furthermore, this law made Muslim women feel as though they were
being intentionally excluded from French society and had little cause to believe that the press
could affect this. Finally, the reasons for which Muslim women choose to veil themselves
(religious, political, revolutionary, practical, etc.) strongly contrast with the dominant frames
associated with veiling in France. For this reason, the opinions of Muslim women, particularly
those who practiced full veiling) would have been difficult to advance.
The absence of the women most intimately and directly affected by the “Burqa Ban”
from discourse in the press is alarming. If Muslim women truly felt that the “Burqa Ban” would
liberate them, their support of the ban would have made for compelling and interesting news.
However, the absence of such support in the press indicates that it did not exist. Given this, the
absence of the opinions of Muslim women in the press represents a strong oppositional
consensus that went largely ignored in coverage of the ban.
Methodological Limitations
In designing a research project, certain methodological decisions must be made that often
limit the parameters of a study. In the case of this project, research was limited by the scope and
size of the sample. The parameters of this study were significantly expanded from the original
size and scope of the research proposal. Nevertheless, certain methodological decisions placed
limitations on this project.
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Firstly, this study was limited by the scope of the sample. This project looked only at
those articles printed during the month of a legislative decision and the month that the law was
enacted. Eleven months elapsed between the date that a draft of the “Burqa Ban” was first
proposed and when it became an enforceable law. Of those eleven months, only 5 were included
in the sample. This limited the time frame of the study and may have resulted in the exclusion of
additional frames not present during the months analyzed here.
Secondly, this project made use of random sampling in order to create a manageable
sample size. The creation of a manageable sample size naturally results in the exclusion of some
articles from the data set. Including all articles published by the selected sources would have
created a more complete research project.
Finally, no Arab language publications were included in this study. This decision was
made for practical reasons, language limitations prevented access to such newspapers. It is
possible that such publications included opinions and perspectives not found in mainstream,
French-language news outlets that could have greatly enriched this study.
Suggestions for Future Research
In the field of Media Studies there are several methodological tools that inform research.
In this study, I took a qualitative approach, focusing on the historical and contextual implications
of the discourse found in the French press. Future studies could be enhanced by a mixed
methods approach to the analysis of press coverage of the Burqa Ban. Such a study would
particularly benefit from a Content Analysis, making use of statistical data to reinforce the
findings of a Critical Discourse Analysis.
Scholars wishing to expand this area of research would be well advised to include news
articles from Arabic publications in France. As previously mentions, such publications likely
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include perspectives and opinions not present in the mainstream French press. For this reason,
such publications could greatly inform scholars seeking to understand the role the French press
played in legitmating the Burqa Ban.
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